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NOTES 
A CALL TO ACTION—EXAMINING NEPAL’S 
POST-CONFLICT STRATEGY TOWARD PERSONS 
ACCUSED OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
Jennifer Chiang* 
 
This Note analyzes Nepal’s attempts to establish accountability and the 
rule of law in the aftermath of its ten-year civil war.  It compares Nepal’s 
treatment of persons implicated in gross human rights violations with the 
international human rights legal framework surrounding a state’s 
international obligations, particularly in its use of transitional justice 
mechanisms.  It argues that Nepal’s failure to bring either administrative 
sanctions or criminal prosecutions against officials accused of human 
rights abuses—and its reliance instead on truth commissions—undermines 
the rule of law and violates the country’s international human rights 
obligations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Arjun Bahadur Lama was celebrating his election as president of the 
local school in April 2005 when he was abducted by members of the Maoist 
party from the village of Chhatrebanjh in Nepal.1  Witnesses say he was 
paraded through villages by his captors and was not seen again.2  Several 
witnesses informed Purni Maya Lama, Arjun Lama’s wife, that her husband 
was brought before Agni Sapkota, a Central Committee Member of the 
Maoist regime, who ordered Maoist soldiers to kill Arjun Lama and bury 
his body.3  It was not until after many years and numerous attempts to start 
an investigation, including an appeal to the Supreme Court of Nepal, that a 
first incident report (FIR) was finally registered on August 11, 2008.4  
Sapkota has never faced investigation or suspension from office; instead, 
despite the allegations against him, he was promoted in May 2011 to 
Minister for Information and Communications.5 
 
 1. Arjun Bahadur Lama, ADVOC. F.-NEPAL, http://www.advocacyforum.org/
emblematic-cases/2011/01/arjun-bahadur-lama.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Nepal Cabinet Reshuffle Draws UN Fire, TIMES INDIA (May 5, 2011, 7:45 PM), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-05/south-asia/29512458_1_human-
rights-maoists-people-s-war-information-and-communications-minister. 
 2012] A CALL TO ACTION 941 
In Nepal’s post-conflict society, there are numerous similar stories of 
individuals being promoted to positions of public power and influence 
despite accusations of grave human rights abuses.6  These stories serve as 
examples of how Nepal has fallen short in its attempts to establish the rule 
of law and meet its international obligations. 
Under international law, Nepal is obligated to guarantee fundamental 
human rights.7  This Note focuses on Nepal’s human rights obligations 
regarding the treatment of persons who have had reports of human rights 
abuses filed against them.  Part I of this Note begins by providing a brief 
history of Nepal and its conflict period.  It then discusses the relevant 
international standards and obligations regarding human rights and explores 
various post-conflict mechanisms for dealing with persons implicated in 
human rights abuses, as well as the Nepal’s existing transitional framework.  
Part II compares these mechanisms with international obligations and 
considers Nepal’s use of transitional justice mechanisms.  Finally, Part III 
argues that Nepal’s actions to date have not met international obligations, 
and that Nepal must take affirmative steps to provide accountability for past 
and continuing human rights violations.  If Nepal is to move forward into 
an era of political stability and democracy, it must strengthen the rule of 
law by addressing past abuses while maintaining due process. 
I.  NEPAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
SURROUNDING ITS TRANSITION 
The first part of this Note provides the international legal framework 
underlying periods of transitional justice.  Part I.A provides a brief history 
of Nepal and the civil war from which the country is attempting to emerge.  
Next, Part I.B establishes the link between transitional justice and the rule 
of law.  Then, Part I.C discusses Nepal’s human rights obligations during its 
post-conflict transition.  Finally, Part I.D provides an overview of various 
transitional justice mechanisms. 
A.  History of Nepal’s Internal Conflict 
Prior to any attempts at democracy, a hereditary monarchy governed 
Nepal for 240 years.8  Even under the subsequent panchayat system, which 
was portrayed as a representative government, the reality was that Nepal’s 
government remained a one-party system ruled by the monarchy.9  
 
 6. See infra Part I.A for a brief history of Nepal’s civil war. 
 7. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 8. See Teresa Whitfield, Conflict Prevention & Peace Forum, Masala Peacemaking:  
Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders, CENTER ON INT’L COOPERATION, 
3 (October 2008), http://www.cic.nyu.edu/staff/docs/whitfield/whitfield_masala_peace
making.pdf (“Nepal was ruled by a feudal and exclusionary monarchy for more than 200 
years.”). 
 9. See Warisha Farasat & Priscilla Hayner, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, 
Negotiating Peace in Nepal:  Implications for Justice, INITIATIVE PEACEBUILDING, 10 (June 
2009), http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Negotiating_Peace_in_Nepal.pdf; see 
also Brad Adams, Nepal at the Precipice, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 121, 124 (“The 
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Frustrated with the lack of real representation, the Nepali people started the 
Jana Andolan I (First People’s Movement) in 1990.10  The movement 
resulted in the overthrow of the old monarchy and the introduction of a 
multiparty democratic system of governance under a new constitutional 
monarchy.11  Despite this initial attempt at democracy, the resulting 
government proved ineffective as political infighting and corruption 
continued.12 
Dissatisfied with the government, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists 
(Maoists) released its “Forty-Point Demands” in February of 1996; among 
them were the expulsion of foreign influences in Nepal and the 
establishment of a secular democracy.13  After the government rejected 
these demands, the Maoists embarked on a “people’s war” against the 
government.14  As they fought, both the government and the Maoists 
committed many human rights abuses including extrajudicial executions, 
disappearances, abductions, and torture.15  The abuses increased in 2001 
after King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and passed the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Ordinance (TADO), which declared the 
Maoists to be terrorists and granted the security forces broad powers to 
arrest those involved in terrorist activities.16  The King continued his efforts 
to consolidate power, which over time fueled increasing dissatisfaction with 
the government and urgency among the previously deadlocked political 
parties, Maoists, and civil society to align against the King.17 
 
panchayat system was touted as a representative system, but in reality the country was run by 
a cluster of like-minded undemocratic politicians who obeyed the will of the king.”).  
 10. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10; Whitfield, supra note 8, at 3 (describing 
the end of the panchayat system of rule in Nepal in 1990 because of a pro-democracy 
people’s movement). 
 11. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10; see also Adams, supra note 9, at 124 
(stating how King Binrendra “gave in to popular demands to lift the ban on political parties 
and create a democratic state”). 
 12. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10 (describing how the ensuing politicians 
came to be seen as “opportunistic and corrupt”); see also Adams, supra note 9, at 125 
(noting that the people’s movement was followed by thirteen increasingly unstable 
governments overrun with political feuds and corruption). 
 13. See Whitfield, supra note 8, at 3 (“The start of the ‘people’s war’ waged by the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) . . . against the Nepali state dates back to February 1996 
when the government rejected a forty-point list of demands.”). 
 14. Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10. 
 15. Id. at 10–11. 
 16. Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, Waiting for Justice:  Unpunished Crimes 
from Nepal’s Armed Conflict, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 10 (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal0908web_0.pdf [hereinafter Waiting for 
Justice] (noting that the majority of civilian deaths that occurred during the conflict period 
occurred after the Royal Nepal Army was deployed); Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10. 
 17. See Advocacy Forum & Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Across the Lines:  The 
Impact of Nepal’s Conflict on Women, OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUMAN RIGHTS, 22 (2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/AdvocacyForum_NepalCEDAW49.
pdf (discussing how the King’s attempt to take power in February 2005 consisted of 
thousands of arbitrary arrests and detainments and hundreds of deaths, which drove political 
parties and the Maoists to begin forming an alliance against the King); Farasat & Hayner, 
supra note 9, at 13. 
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Finally, in April 2006, an extraordinary Jana Andolan II (Second 
People’s Movement) successfully forced the King to give up his power and 
return it to the Parliament, thus restoring democracy.18  The People’s 
Movement also marked an end to the ten-year civil war between the 
Maoists and the government during which over 13,000 lives were claimed 
and both sides of the conflict committed numerous human rights 
violations.19  These abuses committed included disappearances20 and the 
torture of detainees, among others.21 
In November 2006, peace negotiations began in earnest between the 
country’s major political parties and the Maoists.22  On November 21, 
2006, Nepal’s government and the Maoists signed the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), which laid out the basic framework for the 
country’s political transition.23  Less than a month later, Nepal adopted its 
Interim Constitution.24  Under the Interim Constitution, the State is required 
to adopt a political system that upholds fundamental human rights and to 
eliminate corruption and impunity.25  The Constitution also references the 
creation of a high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as 
well as the Commission of Inquiry on Disappearances (Commission on 
Disappearances) aligned with the directives of the CPA; both are intended 
to address the abuses committed during the conflict.26 
The signing of these documents signaled Nepal’s commitment to account 
for past violations of human rights and to pave a path for peace and 
democracy.  Yet, Nepal still has not wholly emerged from conflict and 
authoritarian rule, thus placing it in a transitional period.27 
 
 18. See Waiting for Justice, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that the King announced the 
reinstatement of the House of Representatives on April 24, 2006). 
 19. No. of Victims Killed by State and Maoist in Connection with the “People’s War,” 
INFORMAL SECTOR SERVICE CENTER, http://www.insec.org.np/pics/1247467500.pdf 
[hereinafter INSEC] (calculating that a total of 13,347 deaths occurred during the conflict 
period and reporting that the State was responsible for 8,377 deaths while the Maoists were 
responsible for 4,970 deaths); Q&A:  Nepal’s future, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2009, 10:46 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2707107.stm. 
 20. See Clear Culpability:  “Disappearances” by Security Forces in Nepal, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, 24 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal0205.pdf; 
Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 20 (noting the large number of disappearances). 
 21. See Nat’l Human Rights Comm’n, Human Rights in Nepal:  A Status Report 2003, 
ASIA FOUND., 35 (2003), http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/nepalhumanrights03.pdf. 
 22. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 14. 
 23. Id. 
 24. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 (2007), available at http://www.
lawcommission.gov.np/en/documents/prevailing-laws/constitution.html; see also Donna 
Lyons, Maximising Justice:  Using Transitional Justice Mechanisms to Address Questions of 
Development in Nepal, 13 TRINITY C. L. REV. 111, 114 (2010); Farasat & Hayner, supra note 
9, at 19–20. 
 25. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nepal-Communist Party Nepal (Maoist), ¶ 7.1, 
Nov. 21, 2006 [hereinafter CPA], available at http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/
report/tid_188/2006-11-29-peace_accord-MOFA.pdf (unofficial translation). 
 26. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 20. 
 27. See Lyons, supra note 24, at 115 (pointing to the continued political unrest due to 
the turnover within the government and the continued standstill over the reintegration of 
Maoist rebels). 
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B.  Transitional Justice and the International Legal Framework 
Transitional justice refers to a range of processes and mechanisms that a 
society can implement to address its history of human rights violations in 
order to lay a foundation for accountability, justice, and reconciliation.28  
Integral to transitional justice is the establishment of the rule of law, a 
principle of governance in which all persons are held equally accountable to 
laws that are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards.29  For a society to move past a period of conflict and establish a 
new legacy of peace and democracy, the people must see that the new 
regime is making a good faith effort to apply justice to the past regime’s 
legacy of human rights abuses.30 
1.  Linking the Rule of Law to Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice and the rule of law represent two integrally connected 
concepts in assessing and producing change during a society’s movement 
away from a post-conflict regime.  In any transition, a divide is created 
between the old regime and the new regime, and it is within this divide that 
the officials of the new regime must decide how to respond to calls for 
justice.31 
At the core of transitional justice lies the issue of how a state’s treatment 
of its violent past and its associated human rights abuses will impact the 
success of the state’s transition toward a democratic future.32  The notion 
that a society cannot have closure until it addresses the problems of its past 
has been noted in transitional justice scholarship.33  Thus, the principles of 
transitional justice are often perceived as being focused on the past.34  
 
 28. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-conflict Societies:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 
23, 2004) (defining transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”). 
 29. Id. ¶ 6 (defining the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which 
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards”). 
 30. Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations:  A Comparison of 
Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 89, 92 
(2001). 
 31. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 762, 765–66 (2004).  
 32. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 6 (2000) (“As a state undergoes political 
change, legacies of injustice have a bearing on what is deemed transformative.”). 
 33. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities:  A Review of Accountability 
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 127 
(1996) (“The assumption that individuals or groups who have been the victims of hideous 
atrocities will simply forget about them or expunge their feelings without some form of 
accounting, some semblance of justice, is to leave in place the seeds of future conflict.”). 
 34. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 766 (describing how scholars often see 
transitional justice as backward-looking in its goals).  Justice is defined as “an ideal of 
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Transitional justice mechanisms include, among other things, individual 
prosecutions, truth-seeking, vetting, and dismissals, or some combination of 
the above.35 
The rule of law is an essential element of a democratic state and is 
increasingly crucial during post-conflict reconstruction.36  One aspect of 
establishing the rule of law is the reformation of state institutions.37  
Standing for the ideal that every person is equally accountable to the laws 
of the state regardless of their position within society, the rule of law 
requires measures to ensure the supremacy of, and adherence to, the 
nation’s laws by all people, including those working within state 
institutions.38 
Associating transitional justice with measures focused on the past has 
often been used to condemn transitional justice mechanisms as preventing 
the new regime from expending its valuable energies on forward-looking 
measures that contribute to state building and economic growth.39  Yet, the 
goals of transitional justice are essential for laying the foundation for the 
rule of law and creating a society founded on sustainable peace and 
democracy.40  By understanding the relationship between the backward-
looking goals of transitional justice and the forward-looking goals related to 
building a new society, it becomes clear that, in any successful transitional 
justice regime, addressing the past is a necessary step toward establishing 
the rule of law as a strong foundation for the future. 
A strong message of accountability is integral to the protection of human 
rights.41  It provides a legal basis for citizens to challenge the government 
 
accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and 
punishment of wrongs.” U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 7. 
 35. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 8. 
 36. See David A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs:  A Normative Framework, in 
ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:  A READER 45, 54 (Joel H. Rosenthal & Christian 
Barry eds., 3d ed. 2009) (“Rule of law is especially important in a new and fragile 
democracy bent on distinguishing itself from prior authoritarianism, institutionalized bias, or 
the ‘rule of the gun.’”). 
 37. See id. at 56–57 (arguing that a sustainable transition requires the reformation of 
basic institutions, including, among others, the judiciary, police, military, and structure of 
economic opportunities). 
 38. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 6 (“[The rule of law] requires . . . measures 
to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural 
and legal transparency.”); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law:  What’s the 
Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 827 (2005) (“[R]ule of law refers to a system in 
which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the 
ruling elite . . . .”). 
 39. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 801 (“The impulse is to look forward 
rather than backward; opponents see retroactive justice, and transitional justice generally, as 
a waste of institutional resources compared to the tasks of regime building.”). 
 40. See id. at 765 (“[R]etrospective measures themselves have important forward-
looking justifications . . . .”). 
 41. See Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 812 (“Without rule of law, rights remain lifeless 
paper promises rather than the reality for many throughout the world.”). 
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and thus protects the rights of the non-elite.42  Respect for the rule of law 
will not only deter future human rights violations, it will also aid in the 
development of a democratic state.43 
On the other hand, ignoring the human rights abuses committed in the 
past furthers the injuries of victims who have already been hurt by the 
conflict.44  Victims may see the new society as one based on impunity, 
which might lead to resentment, vigilante retribution, and further periods of 
violent conflict.45  Thus, a new regime’s actions in addressing past human 
rights abuses committed during a conflict period are integral to allowing the 
rule of law and democracy to take root in a new society.46 
2.  Difficulties in the Transition Process 
Due to the unique factors faced by each post-conflict country, there is no 
single approach that can guarantee success in the path to reconstruction.47  
Regardless of which method or combination of methods is pursued by a 
new regime, efforts to establish the rule of law require, at a minimum, time, 
money, and manpower.48  Yet, these are difficult to come by in war-torn 
societies marked by devastated institutions, depleted resources, and 
distrusting populations.49 
Additionally, a lack of political will within the state regime is a common 
obstacle in post-conflict countries.50  Effective rule of law reform in 
devastated countries requires enormous amounts of political will, which in 
turn requires broad consensus and the creation of a united strategy among a 
country’s important stakeholders.51  This requires that a state’s general 
population support the actions being undertaken by the state.  Yet, there is 
often a general lack of public confidence in state institutions and governing 
structures in countries emerging from conflict.52  Even where institutions 
 
 42. See id. at 944–45. 
 43. See Kamali, supra note 30, at 96. 
 44. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 127. 
 45. Id. at 127–28. 
 46. See Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 1 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) (“In fact, 
the pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the 
fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law 
and on respect for the dignity and worth of each human person.”). 
 47. Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 908. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 3 (“[H]elping war-torn societies re-
establish the rule of law and come to terms with large-scale past abuses, all within a context 
marked by devastated institutions, exhausted resources, and diminished security and a 
traumatized and divided population, is a daunting, often overwhelming, task.”). 
 50. Peerenboom, supra note 39, at 909 (describing how many reconstruction efforts fail 
due to lack of political will, lack of resources, and lack of funds). 
 51. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 20 (arguing that inadequate investment 
in public consultations on reform questions and a consensus among important stakeholders 
about the nature of necessary reforms leads to inadequate establishment of the rule of law in 
post-conflict states). 
 52. See id. ¶ 3. 
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were once credible, years of war and repressive dictatorship can lead to 
these institutions being tainted by corruption, thus contributing to a 
perceived lack of legitimacy by the public.53  Moving ahead with 
transitional justice mechanisms without addressing the public’s skepticism 
of the state’s legitimacy can hinder the state’s pursuits.54 
Beyond the problems of political will and public support, post-conflict 
countries also face a significant hurdle from a lack of resources—structural, 
technical, and material.  Countries that have experienced conflict are often 
left with considerably damaged infrastructures.55  Thus, state institutions 
may be minimally functional, with limited capacity to address the process 
of rebuilding.56  Additionally, the technical capacity available to address the 
multitude of complex questions faced by the state can be limited.57  Lastly, 
any transitional justice mechanism requires a large influx of funds and other 
material resources that are often unavailable.58  Thus, given the multitude of 
problems inherent in many post-conflict situations, any approach to justice 
undertaken by a state must factor in these difficulties. 
C.  Nepal’s Human Rights Obligations Under International Law 
The transitional justice mechanisms employed by a state must be aligned 
with the state’s human rights obligations.  This is particularly true in post-
conflict situations where the rule of law and the legitimacy of state regimes 
already rest on a precarious foundation.59  How to handle persons accused 
of human rights abuses is a particularly difficult question, as it requires 
states to strike a balance between its various obligations to victims, the 
accused, and the general population.60 
 
 53. See Neil J. Kritz, Where We Are and How We Got Here:  An Overview of 
Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation, in THE LEGACY OF ABUSE:  
CONFRONTING THE PAST, FACING THE FUTURE 21, 30 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 2002) (noting 
how civil war or years under repressive dictatorship can destroy criminal justice systems or 
leave them tainted by corruption, even where the judicial institutions and their personnel 
were once credible). 
 54. See Kamali, supra note 30, at 93 (“Hasty prosecutions of human rights violators by a 
legal system that is incapable of handling numerous cases or that has not yet gained 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public would have the opposite effect of its intended pursuit of 
justice.”). 
 55. See Serge Rumin, Gathering and Managing Information in Vetting Processes, in 
JUSTICE AS PREVENTION:  VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 403, 408 
(Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2007) (“Conflicts often bring about the 
destruction of countries’ infrastructure and institutions.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 53, at 35 (“The criminal justice system of every country 
emerging from a pattern of mass abuses is compromised and minimally functional, with 
severely limited capacity at best.”). 
 57. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 27; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra 
note 31, at 766 (“Purges, for example, can further political reform by eliminating the 
influence of officials of the prior regime, but they can also interfere with political reform by 
depriving the new state of skilled administrators.”). 
 58. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 64(l). 
 59. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 60. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 7 (“Justice implies regard for the rights 
of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large.”). 
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1.  Sources of Nepal’s Human Rights Obligations 
In 1991, Nepal became a party to most of the major international human 
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights61 (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights62 (ICESCR), and the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment63 (CAT).  Along 
with its international treaty obligations, Nepal is bound by customary 
international law, which consists of fundamental provisions of international 
human rights law that have obtained customary international status and thus 
form part of general international law.64 
Domestically, the provisions of the human rights treaties to which Nepal 
is a party are incorporated into, and enforceable as part of, Nepal’s domestic 
law through the Nepal Treaty Act.65  Nepal’s Interim Constitution further 
establishes that the government is responsible for adopting a political 
system fully aligned with fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and 
the elimination of impunity.66  Nepal’s government is also responsible for 
effectively implementing international treaties to which Nepal is a party67 
and must have as one of its key objectives the promotion of the general 
welfare by making provisions for the protection and promotion of human 
rights.68 
2.  The State’s Duty to Prevent Human Rights Violations 
As a state party to the ICCPR, Nepal must guarantee the full enjoyment 
of fundamental human rights.69  Thus, Nepal has a duty to prevent human 
 
 61. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; Ratification of International Human Rights 
Treaties—Nepal, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/
ratification-nepal.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Ratification of Treaties—
Nepal]. 
 62. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm; Ratification of Treaties—Nepal, supra note 
61. 
 63. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 
[hereinafter CAT], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm; Ratification of 
Treaties—Nepal, supra note 61. 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987). 
 65. Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, ¶ 9, Nov. 9, 1990, available at http://www.lawcommission.
gov.np/en/documents/prevailing-laws/prevailing-acts.html. 
 66. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 33(c), available at http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/
en/documents/prevailing-laws/constitution.html. 
 67. Id. art. 33(m). 
 68. Id. art. 34(2). 
 69. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2(3).  Nepal became party to the ICCPR in 1991. See 
Ratification of Treaties—Nepal, supra note 61. 
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rights violations70 and to end impunity for human rights abuses that 
occurred during its ten-year conflict.71  This duty to prevent and punish 
human rights abuses is part of its obligation to guarantee the full enjoyment 
of rights and has been reaffirmed under international jurisprudence.72 
The duty to prevent human rights violations calls into question the 
practice of allowing persons implicated in human rights abuses to serve in a 
state’s public institutions.73  As a means of guaranteeing the nonoccurrence 
of human rights violations, it has been recommended that states remove 
officials who have been found responsible for human rights violations from 
public service.74  This includes refraining from hiring or recruiting persons 
implicated in human rights violations, and permanently removing members 
of a state’s security forces implicated in such violations.75 
The duty extends to the suspension of state agents implicated in human 
rights violations while investigations into the alleged abuses are ongoing.76  
This has been especially important when the individual is accused of forced 
disappearances;77 extralegal, arbitrary, and summary executions;78 or 
torture.79 
 
 70. Federico Andreu-Guzmán, Due Process and Vetting, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, 
supra note 55, at 449, 450. 
 71. Id. at 449. 
 72. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Husband of Maria Fanny Suarez de 
Guerrero v. Colombia, Commc’n No. 45/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (1982), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/44cf17fed78ca4e7c1256ab5002b7234?
Opendocument.  Although Nepal is not a state party to the regional human rights bodies that 
have adjudicated on this issue, those decisions hold the weight of customary international 
law and point to the rising status of this duty within international human rights law. See 
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 166, 174 (July 29, 1988); 
Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22535/93, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 102 (2000). 
 73. Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 450 (“The duty to prevent raises the question as 
to the presence in the public administration . . . of persons implicated in gross human rights 
violations.”). 
 74. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 36(a), U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005). 
 75. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee:  Argentina, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG (Nov. 15, 2000), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3b39f0977.pdf; U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:  Brazil, ¶ 325, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.66 (July 24, 1999) [hereinafter Concluding Observations:  Brazil], 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9d8f4abc5536855fc12563ea0057
e768?Opendocument; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee:  Guatemala, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63 (Apr. 3, 1996), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/176bb26c29e92ac2c12563dc0050f64a?
Opendocument; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee:  Serbia & Montenegro, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/81/SEMO (Aug. 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/c4f9dd7baa1e61aec1256ee1004c4a96?Open
document. 
 76. Concluding Observations:  Brazil, supra note 75, ¶ 325. 
 77. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. 
Res. 47/133, art. 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) (providing that alleged 
perpetrators of a forced disappearance must be suspended from any official duties during the 
investigation into the crime). 
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3.  Victims’ Rights to an Effective Remedy 
Turning to the victims of abuses, where a person’s human rights have 
been violated, there are rights held by the victim that must be protected.  
One of the overarching rights is the right to an effective remedy.80  In 
respecting this right, the state has the obligation to ensure that individuals 
have remedies that are both accessible and effective.81  The right to an 
effective remedy is an obligation inherent in the ICCPR that must be 
complied with even in times of emergency.82  Connected to this is the duty 
to take state action against those implicated in human rights violations.83  
To fully give effect to the rights of victims, all human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations must be thoroughly investigated 
and, if appropriate, prosecuted and punished.84  Failing to do so may give 
rise to a separate breach by the state of its human rights obligations.85 
The duty to conduct official investigations into allegations of human 
rights violations for which complaints have been filed, or which are 
otherwise known, is presumed by the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the European 
 
 78. See Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1989/65 (May 24, 
1989). 
 79. See Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 55/89, ¶ 3(b), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/55/89 (Dec. 4, 2000) (stating that persons involved in such crimes must be 
“removed from any position of control or power, whether direct or indirect, over 
complainants, witnesses and their families, as well as those conducting the investigation”). 
 80. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2(3)(a); U.N. Human Rights Comm., The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff600533f5f?Opendocument [hereinafter General Legal 
Obligation]. 
 81. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., George Kazantzis v. Cyprus, Comment No. 
972/2001, ¶ 6.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/972/2001 (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/country,,HRC,,CYP,,4282286d4,0.html. 
 82. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Article 4:  Derogations During a State of 
Emergency, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/453883fd1f.pdf (describing the right to an effective 
remedy as a “fundamental obligation” that cannot be derogated from). 
 83. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 
2006). 
 84. See id. (“In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, 
States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to 
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty 
to punish her or him.”). 
 85. See General Legal Obligation, supra note 80, ¶ 18 (“As with failure to investigate, 
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a 
separate breach of the Covenant.”). 
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Court of Human Rights to be a measure owed to the individual victim.86  
These bodies also stress that the obligation to investigate is born once 
authorities gain knowledge of alleged misconduct and does not rest on 
whether an individual has lodged a formal complaint.87  Additionally, these 
bodies have held that state officials implicated in human rights offenses 
should be suspended pending completion of investigations into the 
allegations.88 
Once investigations are completed, there is a further duty to bring 
criminal prosecutions against those who have been implicated.89  This is 
necessary not only to protect the rights of victims but also to preserve the 
rule of law.90  Specific provisions lay out the duty to prosecute specific 
types of crimes.  Each of the four Geneva Conventions, which govern war 
crimes and grave breaches of human rights during international armed 
conflict, imposes a duty to search for persons who have allegedly 
committed crimes, to provide penal sanctions, and to bring alleged 
perpetrators to justice.91  Regarding crimes against humanity, HRC General 
Comment Number 31 discussing duties under the ICCPR provides that, 
 
 86. ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 190 
(2009).  States have the duty to combat impunity and to ensure effective investigation and 
prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international law. See U.N. Human 
Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, ¶ 55, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/12/18 (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Report of the High Commissioner]. 
 87. See, e.g., Musayeva v. Russia, App. No. 74239/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 85–86 (2007) 
(reiterating that “authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their 
attention”); Yaşa v. Turkey, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 100 (stating that the mere fact that 
authorities were informed about the murder of a victim led “ipso facto to an obligation under 
Article 2 to carry out an effective investigation”). 
 88. See, e.g., Concluding Observations:  Brazil, supra note 75, ¶ 325 (stating that “the 
forces against whom allegations of such offences are being investigated be suspended from 
their posts pending completion of the investigation”); Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Question of Torture, ¶ 26(k), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2003/68 (Dec. 17, 2002) (by Theo van 
Boven) (suggesting that when complaints have been lodged against an official, the public 
officials should be suspended unless the allegation is “manifestly ill-founded”). 
 89. The Inter-American Court and Commission have found an individual right to 
criminal prosecution and punishment of those found responsible for serious human rights 
violations. See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 86, at 191. 
 90. Id. at 189. 
 91. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/365?OpenDocument (setting out states’ 
obligations during periods of international and internal armed conflict); Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/370?OpenDocument (same); Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument (same); Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
380?OpenDocument (same).  Nepal became a party to the Geneva Conventions in 1964. See 
Ratification of Treaties—Nepal, supra note 61. 
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where investigations lead to information about perpetrators, “failure to 
bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give 
rise to a separate breach of the Covenant.”92  Similarly, the CAT requires 
that all cases of alleged torture be submitted to the proper authorities for 
prosecution.93 
4.  Due Process Rights of the Accused 
Any state action against those accused of human rights violations must be 
undertaken in a manner that respects the due process rights of the accused.  
Due process and fair trial rights are guaranteed under international 
standards and have become a jus cogens94 norm of international criminal 
law.95  Due process guarantees, among other things, the presumption of 
innocence, the right to a defense and to be assisted by counsel, the right to 
prior and detailed notice of charges, and the right to appeal judgments to a 
higher court.96 
The presumption of innocence is one of the most fundamental due 
process rights held by the accused.97  Any action taken against those 
accused of human rights abuses must ensure that criminal guilt does not 
attach prior to proof of guilt.98  With regard to public officials accused of 
abuses, the right to hold a job in public service in conditions of equality and 
without unlawful discrimination or unreasonable restrictions may be 
implicated.99  While the right does not entitle every citizen guaranteed 
employment in the public service sector, it does necessitate a right of equal 
access to such positions.100  This right has also been interpreted to 
encompass the freedom to engage in political activity, to debate about 
public affairs, and to criticize the existing government.101 
 
 92. General Legal Obligation, supra note 80, ¶ 18. 
 93. CAT, supra note 63, arts. 4(1), 7(1). 
 94. Jus cogens refers to norms “accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm for general international law having the same 
character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
 95. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 252 (2d ed. 2008) (“It is tenable that the principle of due process and fair 
trial has evolved to a jus cogens norm of [international criminal law] . . . .”). 
 96. Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 463. 
 97. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 14(2). 
 98. Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 463. 
 99. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 25. 
 100. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Wieslaw Kall v. Poland, Comment No. 552/1993, 
¶ 13.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/552/1993 (1997), available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/
SIM/CaseLaw/fulltextccpr.nsf/160f6e7f0fb318e8c1256d410033e0a1/49c77b8ab56f2eed412
56d64003865d9?OpenDocument. 
 101. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo 
S. Dobou v. Togo, Comment Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990, 424/1990, ¶ 7.5, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990, 424/1990 (1996), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/undocs/html/VWS422R1.htm (“The rights enshrined in article 25 should also be 
read to encompass the freedom to engage in political activity individually or through 
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Procedural rights are also implicated.  The core procedural right is the 
right to have one’s case heard fairly and publicly “by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”102  The U.N. 
Secretary-General has identified the following procedural guarantees for 
those accused of human rights violations:  the right to be informed of 
allegations against them, the right to address the entity in charge of the 
investigation, the right to be informed of the charges within a reasonable 
time, and the right to appeal an adverse decision to a court or other 
independent body.103 
D.  Transitional Justice Mechanisms and the Rule of Law 
Given the unique nature of conflicts faced by individual countries, the 
response of new regimes can vary widely.104  Criminal proceedings, 
administrative sanctions, and truth commissions are often used as responses 
to the different needs and problems emerging during a conflict’s aftermath 
that operate to address periods of massive human rights violations.105 
1.  Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions 
Criminal proceedings can play a vital role in transitional contexts for 
many reasons.  One of the benefits resulting from bringing those 
responsible for serious human rights violations to justice in a public manner 
is the restoration of dignity for victims.106  Furthermore, the victim’s 
opportunity to witness human rights abusers answer for their crimes may 
restore the victim’s sense of justice.107 
For the larger society, public denunciation of criminal behavior 
demarcates the regime of the past from the regime of the present and sends 
a credible signal to the public that the new order is committed to the rule of 
law.108  This hopefully infuses individuals with greater public confidence in 
the new regime’s ability, willingness, and commitment to enforce both 
domestic and international laws.109  The declaration of a commitment to 
prosecute violators of human rights and the consequential rise in the 
 
political parties, freedom to debate public affairs, to criticize the Government and to publish 
material with political content.”). 
 102. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 14(1). 
 103. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52. 
 104. See Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 908. 
 105. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 8. 
 106. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:  The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991) (arguing that the inherent 
dignity of individuals can be restored through trials). 
 107. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 39. 
 108. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 128 (“A public airing and condemnation of these crimes 
may be the best way to draw a line between times past and present, lest the public perceive 
the new order as simply more of the same.”). 
 109. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 39. 
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public’s confidence in the new regime help establish the rule of law in the 
post-conflict regime.110 
The direct accountability provided by criminal trials also furthers the 
goal of deterrence.111  Criminal prosecutions play an essential role in 
preventing the reoccurrence of human rights abuses, both individually with 
regard to the perpetrator and generally with regard to society as a whole.112  
By deterring further abuses, criminal prosecutions contribute to the 
establishment of peace.113 
2.  Administrative Sanctions 
Vetting is the process by which an individual’s integrity is assessed for 
the purpose of determining his or her suitability for employment as a public 
official.114  From the transitional justice perspective, the most important 
consideration in evaluating suitability is a person’s observance of human 
rights standards and professional conduct.115  This extends beyond the 
individual to the institutional level, such that the institutions most complicit 
in engaging in human rights violations during the conflict must also be 
vetted.116  Removing from service those officials responsible for violations 
of human rights is critical in the transformation of a society into one run by 
institutions that respect human rights.117  Ultimately, the goal of vetting is 
to build fair and effective institutions that are able to prevent future 
recurrences of the human rights abuses that plagued a society’s past.118 
The intended end result of a vetting process is the identification and 
exclusion from public offices of individuals found to be responsible for 
 
 110. See Kritz, supra note 53, at 25 (arguing that criminal prosecutions replace impunity 
with accountability and establish credibility for distrusted institutions). 
 111. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 39. 
 112. See Orentlicher, supra note 106, at 2542 (stating that the arguments in favor of 
criminal punishment rest on the idea that “it is the most effective insurance against future 
repression”). 
 113. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 38. 
 114. See Ved P. Nanda, Civil and Political Sanctions As an Accountability Mechanism for 
Massive Violations of Human Rights, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 389, 396 (1998) 
(describing vetting as the exclusion from public office and positions of influence those who 
are found to have committed serious violations of human rights). 
 115. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, Vetting Public 
Employees in Post-conflict Settings:  Operational Guidelines, INT’L CENTER TRANSITIONAL 
JUST., 20 (2006), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-UNDP-Global-Vetting-Operational-
Guidelines-2006-English.pdf  (describing gross violations of human rights as serious crimes, 
involvement in which “indicate[s] a lack of integrity at a level that fundamentally affects a 
person’s credibility to hold public service”). 
 116. Roger Duthie, Introduction, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 55, at 17, 20–21. 
 117. See Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 470 (stating that the question of vetting 
proceedings “is crucial for the effectiveness of the rule of law, the strengthening, 
construction, or reconstruction of a state that guarantees human rights, and the restoration of 
the public’s confidence”). 
 118. See Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 86, ¶ 37; see also W. Michael 
Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, 59 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (1996) (citing the “fundamental sanctioning goals” as being 
the “protection, restoration, and improvement of public order”). 
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abuses.119  Generally speaking, individuals who are under investigation are 
notified of the allegations against them, given the opportunity to respond to 
the allegations, and provided the right to appeal an adverse decision to 
another independent body.120  The resulting exclusions tend to be 
temporary and are meant to provide a new regime with a period during 
which the people’s confidence in the governing institutions can be reformed 
before allowing members of the old regime to participate again.121 
Administrative sanctions have long been used to address serious 
violations of human rights.122  Due to its importance as a component of 
transitional justice and the establishment of the rule of law, vetting is a 
mechanism that has been applied to a large number of people in post-
conflict situations.123  This mechanism provides protection for newly 
formed democratic states from the dangers associated with institutions run 
by untrustworthy or insufficiently loyal officials.124  Furthermore, vetting 
helps facilitate the establishment of the rule of law in new regimes by 
sending a “salutary signal” to victims and to society that those responsible 
for human rights violations will not be permitted to stay in power, thus 
adding to the credibility of post-conflict regimes.125 
Transitions require that public institutions previously complicit in 
perpetuating conflict “be transformed into institutions that sustain peace, 
protect human rights, and foster a culture of respect for the rule of law.”126  
The vetting or screening of public officials for human rights violations 
committed in the past has proven to be critical as an accountability 
mechanism127 and for strengthening institutions in post-conflict societies.128 
 
 119. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52.  For purposes of vetting, exclusion 
includes both the termination and restriction of access to public employment. See Andreu-
Guzmán, supra note 70, at 452. 
 120. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52. 
 121. Kritz, supra note 33, at 139. 
 122. After World War II, many European countries used civil and political sanctions 
against those who had aligned themselves with the Nazis. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 390.  
For example, France sanctioned more than 7,500 alleged collaborators with the Vichy 
regime, which led to the removal from office of over nearly 1,500 politicians and diplomats. 
See Kritz, supra note 33, at 139.  Also, Italian authorities temporarily dismissed nearly 1,600 
government employees based on their wartime activities and human rights violations. See id. 
 123. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 139–40 (arguing that vetting mechanisms make more 
plausible the ability to process large numbers of potential cases as often exist in post-conflict 
situations); see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52 (noting how U.N. 
assistance has frequently been sought in vetting processes). 
 124. Jiri Priban, Oppressors and Their Victims:  The Czech Lustration Law and the Rule 
of Law, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 55, at 308, 318 (noting how the Constitutional 
Court of the Czech Republic upheld the constitutionality of the lustration law as an 
instrument “requesting the political loyalty of civil servants and protecting the democratic 
regime against political threats”). 
 125. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52; Kritz, supra note 33, at 140; Nanda, 
supra note 114, at 396. 
 126. Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 86, ¶ 37. 
 127. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 389 (“Civil and political sanctions applied on an 
individual basis and with due process for the defendant serve an important function as one of 
the accountability mechanisms available to redress massive violations of human rights.”). 
 128. Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 22. 
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3.  Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions are temporary, nonjudicial, official bodies created to 
understand the broader causes, consequences, and patterns of past human 
rights violations that occurred during a conflict.129  This broader analysis 
can include an investigation of the structural elements of the government 
and security forces that allowed human rights abuses to occur.130  The 
impetus behind truth commissions is the belief that understanding why 
events occurred can be as important as knowing exactly what happened.131  
Ultimately, the work of a truth commission helps a society transition toward 
peace by creating an official and public acknowledgement of the past, 
allowing the voices of victims to be heard, and submitting 
recommendations for reforms needed to prevent further abuses.132 
To achieve its goals, the core activities of truth commissions include 
taking statements, investigating, researching, holding public hearings, and 
creating a final public report.133  Statement taking involves obtaining 
statements directly from victims and witnesses of human rights violations in 
a process designed to allow them to recount their experiences in a safe 
environment.134  With regard to investigations and research, commissions 
will typically select a few emblematic cases for investigation.135  Public 
hearings conducted by the commission give victims and survivors the 
opportunity to share their stories in front of a public audience and thus serve 
as a forum for publicly acknowledging past wrongs.136  This not only gives 
victims the opportunity to be heard and to have their stories be made part of 
the country’s official records, but it can also facilitate a public debate about 
how to address the past.137  The work that a commission does is 
incorporated into a final report that summarizes its findings and provides 
recommendations for reforms to the state.138 
Truth commissions have been established as a means of addressing 
historical injustices in various contexts worldwide and have enjoyed 
 
 129. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 141 (stating that truth commissions are perceived to be 
legitimate and impartial official bodies charged with investigating violations of human rights 
under the conflict in question and producing an official history of the abuses); see also 
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-conflict 
States:  Truth Commissions, 1–2, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/1 (2006) [hereinafter Rule-of-Law 
Tools:  Truth Commissions]. 
 130. Kritz, supra note 33, at 141. 
 131. See Rule-of-Law Tools:  Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 1–2. 
 132. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 141 (noting the cathartic effects that the public airing of 
the pain inflicted during the conflict period and the creation of an official record of the truth 
can have). 
 133. See Rule-of-Law Tools:  Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 1. 
 134. Id. at 17. 
 135. Id. at 18. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 50; see also Kritz, supra note 33, at 
141. 
 138. See Rule-of-Law Tools:  Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 19. 
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varying levels of effectiveness.139  They play an important role in providing 
a full account of past human rights violations and addressing the larger 
context and root causes of a conflict.140  Furthermore, they can serve many 
reconciliatory purposes such as giving voice to victims, providing 
meaningful societal acknowledgement of the abuses that occurred, and 
educating the public.141  Truth commissions can also be necessary due to 
the high levels of corruption and incompetence within the security forces 
and the judiciary in transitional states; they can provide a way to avoid 
postponing justice until the existing institutions are adequately reformed.142  
Ultimately, truth commissions can play an important role in fostering 
accountability, preserving evidence, and identifying perpetrators of 
crimes.143 
II.  IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS AND STRATEGIES IN POST-
CONFLICT SITUATIONS 
Every country in a post-conflict situation must grapple with the question 
of how best to embark upon the journey toward a new society.  Still, every 
transition must be framed by a set of minimum standards in which domestic 
and international laws are respected.  Part II of this Note first explores the 
ability of each of the aforementioned transitional justice mechanisms to 
enable a state to meet its human rights obligations in post-conflict 
situations.  It then compares these mechanisms to the current methods 
employed by the government of Nepal in addressing the abuses that 
occurred during Nepal’s civil war. 
A.  Achieving Balance in the Use of Transitional Justice Mechanisms in a 
Post-conflict Society 
Criminal proceedings, administrative sanctions, and truth commissions 
serve different functions and thereby make different contributions to 
restoration in post-conflict societies.  This section will look at the benefits 
and drawbacks of each mechanism in relation to international human rights 
obligations and at how the three mechanisms can interact together in post-
conflict societies. 
 
 139. See id. at 20 (comparing the relative effectiveness of different truth commissions). 
 140. See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice:  Amnesties, Truth 
Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 484 (2003). 
 141. Id.  
 142. See Kristin Bohl, Breaking the Rules of Transitional Justice, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 557, 
573 (2006) (“In addition, some scholars explain that truth commissions become necessary in 
light of the corruption and incompetence of both the police and the judiciary in many 
transitional states.  By circumventing the ‘normal investigatory channels,’ truth commissions 
avoid postponing justice until an independent, capable judiciary is established, constitutional 
reforms are implemented, and political concerns about the power of the past regime are 
overcome.” (quoting Juan Méndez, Book Review, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 577, 584 
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 143. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 50. 
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1.  Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions 
Criminal proceedings offer a number of benefits in a post-conflict 
society, including reestablishing public confidence in government 
institutions144 and the rule of law.145  History has shown that the 
investigation and prosecution of a nation’s leaders for human rights abuses 
can benefit countries emerging from conflict.  For example, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted 
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic and four other top officials for 
multiple counts of alleged human rights abuses and war crimes.146  
Conventional wisdom at the time was that an indictment against a top 
official would serve only to disrupt the peace process by making Milosevic 
unwilling to contribute to negotiations aimed at ending the armed 
conflict.147  Instead, a week later, Milosevic had accepted the terms of an 
international peace plan for Kosovo.148  In this example, provisions relating 
to accountability did not interfere with peace but helped to establish a 
foundation for emergence from conflict. 
Criminal prosecutions do, however, face unique limitations as 
mechanisms of transitional justice.  In post-conflict situations that involve 
mass conflict, the sheer number of potential criminals to process through 
the criminal justice system can overwhelm an already fragile judicial 
system.149  Thus, in virtually all cases of mass abuse, accountability through 
criminal prosecutions must be sought selectively.150  A state seeking to hold 
responsible those who have violated human rights must use pragmatism to 
 
 144. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
146. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, President 
Milosevic and Four Other Senior Fry Officials Indicted for Murder, Persecution and 
Deportation in Kosovo, U.N. Press Release JL/PIU/403-E (May 27, 1999), available at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7765. 
 147. Marcus Tanner, War in the Balkans:  Milosevic Charge Splits Allies, INDEPENDENT 
(May 28, 1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/war-in-the-balkans-milosevic-charge-
splits-allies-1096257.html. 
 148. Milosevic Accepts Peace Plan, Finnish Envoy Says, CNN (June 3, 1999, 9:12 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/03/kosovo.peace.04/. 
 149. See Peerenboom, supra note 39, at 907–08 (“In the wake of regime change in failed 
and transitional states in particular, the legal system is often weak or non-existent.”); see also 
Kritz, supra note 53, at 35 (arguing that in societies that have witnessed systematic patterns 
of atrocity that consistently violated human rights, every person in the system is potentially 
implicated in the crimes committed); Orentlicher, supra note 106, at 2596 (arguing that even 
under a well-established judicial system, prosecuting all those responsible for crimes would 
be virtually impossible).  An example of a country undergoing a difficulty like this one is 
Rwanda, where insisting that every person who participated in the genocide be prosecuted 
would have led to putting more than 100,000 Rwandans on trial, which would have been 
unmanageable and destabilizing in a country whose criminal justice system was decimated. 
See Kritz, supra note 33, at 135. 
 150. Kritz, supra note 33, at 138; Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 917 (“[T]he reality is 
that relatively few people are ever prosecuted either in domestic or international courts for 
their participation in mass societal violence, war crimes or abuses under authoritarian 
regimes.”). 
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temper an absolutist approach to criminal prosecutions, making strategic 
choices in structuring criminal prosecution systems.151 
2.  Administrative Sanctions 
In certain situations, noncriminal mechanisms may be a better method of 
pursuing justice for violators of human rights abuses.152  In most Eastern 
and Central European countries, lustration was the administrative 
mechanism used in lieu of criminal prosecutions.153  Czechoslovakia was 
among the first to adopt lustration laws in Eastern Europe.154  These laws 
prohibited former Communist officials and secret police collaborators from 
holding a variety of public positions, including positions in the state 
administration, the army, the federal police, the judiciary, state-owned 
businesses, and academic institutions.155  These laws were inherited by the 
Czech Republic but not by Slovakia when the two nations split.156  The 
resulting difference in the integrity of those in public service was ultimately 
a factor in the Czech Republic’s transition to a liberal democracy as 
compared to Slovakia’s subsequent authoritarian regime.157 
In practice, however, civil and political sanctions have rarely been 
applied fairly.158  For one, such procedures may violate the right to the 
presumption of innocence since public officials may be removed from 
office prior to undergoing a process through which guilt is determined.159  
As one commentator notes, “It is very important that the trials are not 
conducted as ‘witch hunts,’ where the accused are summarily found guilty 
without any sort of due process rights to answer their accusers.”160  
Additionally, the procedural right to have one’s case heard fairly and 
 
 151. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 46 (advocating that a state’s prosecutorial 
strategy must be strategic due to the reality that the vast majority of human rights 
perpetrators will never be tried); Kritz, supra note 53, at 35 (“Attempting to prosecute or 
purge all those implicated would be politically destabilizing, economically devastating and 
logistically impossible.”). 
 152. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 135 (“[I]n most cases of mass abuse, those whose 
offenses were minimal should probably be handled through a non-criminal mechanism 
. . . .”). 
 153. Nanda, supra note 114, at 393. 
 154. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 802. 
 155. Id. at 806; see also Nanda, supra note 114, at 393–94.  The lustration laws 
prohibited certain persons from having access to key positions in the public administration 
and the judiciary because of the posts they previously held. See Posner & Vermeule, supra 
note 31, at 806. 
 156. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 807. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 140. 
 159. See Mark Gibney, Decommunization:  Human Rights Lessons from the Past and 
Present, and Prospects for the Future, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 87, 124 (1994). 
 160. Adrienne M. Quill, Comment, To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute:  Problems 
Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 190 (1996); see 
also Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 449 (arguing that vetting procedures “raise the 
question of the rights of the persons targeted by such measures, for in the past these 
measures have repeatedly assumed the dimensions of veritable purges or witch hunts”). 
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publicly by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal161 may be 
implicated.162  Another common concern with vetting processes is that they 
tend to be conducted on a large-scale basis and thus fail to provide the level 
of individual due process protections to defendants as would be found in 
traditional criminal proceedings.163  Vetting processes tend to bar entire 
groups of people from holding public positions, which “smacks of imposing 
collective guilt.”164 
Some international bodies have implied, however, that administrative 
sanctions may by themselves be insufficient.  Vetting procedures are 
administrative by nature in that the aim is to prevent further perpetuations 
of regimes in which human rights violations run rampant.165  They are not 
“punitive per se” and thus cannot be seen as a replacement for criminal 
prosecutions aimed at determining an individual’s criminal liability.166  In 
Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia,167 the HRC rejected the notion that 
disciplinary sanctions and judgments of an administrative tribunal could 
constitute an effective remedy.168  Rather, the HRC said that purely 
disciplinary and administrative remedies were inadequate under the 
effective remedy provision of Article 2(3) of the ICCPR.169  Again, the 
HRC reiterated that state parties are under a duty to thoroughly investigate 
violations of human rights and to criminally prosecute those found 
responsible.170 
When used in combination with other transitional mechanisms, vetting 
and the application of civil or political sanctions can be extremely effective 
in helping a country transition toward peace.  For example, under the Peace 
Accords in El Salvador, two commissions were appointed—a Truth 
Commission and an Ad Hoc Commission.171  The Truth Commission was 
tasked with investigating serious allegations of human rights violations and 
taking measures necessary to prevent the repetition of such crimes.172  
 
 161. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 14(1). 
 162. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Felix Enrique Chira Vargas-Machuca v. Peru, 
Comment No. 906/2000, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/906/2000 (2002), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/906-2000.html (holding that Article 14(1) 
guarantees everyone the right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal or court, including the 
right of access to a civil court). 
 163. Kritz, supra note 33, at 140. 
 164. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 397; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, 
¶ 52 (noting how vetting processes without due process elements can become wholesale 
purges involving wide-scale dismissal and disqualification based on party affiliation, 
political opinion, or association with a prior State institution instead of on individual 
records). 
 165. See Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 455. 
 166. See id. at 455–56. 
 167. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Comment No. 563/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (1995), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session
55/vws56355.htm. 
 168. Id. ¶ 10. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 392. 
 172. Id. 
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Alongside the Truth Commission, El Salvador’s Ad Hoc Commission was 
given the task of cleansing the military by making recommendations about 
the transfer or discharge of military officers based on their past history of 
human rights abuses.173  Ultimately, the Ad Hoc Commission 
recommended the transfer or discharge of 102 active-duty officers.174  In 
addition to cleansing the army, the implementation of the recommendations 
from the Ad Hoc Commission led to a “greater degree of accountability 
than many in El Salvador had thought possible.”175  Thus, administrative 
sanctions have been shown to positively affect a transitional state when 
used in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms. 
3.  Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions, while an important component of transitions, cannot 
themselves sufficiently provide justice.176  Truth commissions serve many 
important functions in post-conflict situations, such as providing a full 
account of the given conflict and ensuring that victims are fully heard.177  
Still, while it is generally recognized that truth commissions can positively 
complement criminal tribunals,178 they are by themselves an incomplete 
method of establishing the rule of law and addressing past abuses, as they 
are limited in function.179 
By mandate, truth commissions are investigative, nonjudicial bodies and 
thus do not have any prosecutorial powers.180  They cannot determine 
culpability, punish perpetrators, or have their recommendations enforced.181  
Thus, the idea that truth commissions and criminal trials are mutually 
exclusive is a misperception, and a common one at that.182  Rather, it is 
through the judicial system’s criminal justice mechanisms that the need for 
 
 173. See id. at 393. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Kritz, supra note 33, at 140. 
 176. Id. at 141 (arguing that truth commissions cannot substitute for prosecutions); see 
also Bohl, supra note 142, at 573 (“[T]ruth commissions suffice only as complements, not 
replacements, for prosecutions.”). 
 177. See Amnesty Int’l, Truth, Justice and Reparation:  Establishing an Effective Truth 
Commission 1, AI Index POL 30/009/2007 (June 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/77ee33de-d38a-11dd-a329-
2f46302a8cc6/pol300092007en.pdf (showing how truth commissions “can play an important 
role in providing a full account of past human rights violations, contributing to their 
investigation and eventual prosecution, preventing their repetition, and ensuring that victims 
and their relatives are provided with full reparation”). 
 178. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 26. 
 179. See Bohl, supra note 142, at 575 (“The positive by-products of their efforts are 
undeniable, but any government seeking to facilitate a just transition must view truth 
commissions merely as predecessors or complements to prosecutions, not as 
replacements.”). 
 180. See Rule-of-Law Tools:  Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 1. 
 181. Id. at 11. 
 182. Kritz, supra note 33, at 143. 
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accountability, deterrence, and guarantees of nonrepetition is more 
adequately met.183 
It is the practice of many truth commissions to hold themselves out as 
favorable toward prosecutions for violations of international law.184  Many 
truth commissions recommend that the evidence gathered through their 
proceedings be handed over to the prosecuting authorities to be used in 
further judicial investigations and potential criminal prosecutions for the 
events documented.185  For example, the vast amounts of information 
produced by the Argentinean truth commission were used to prosecute 
members of the military junta implicated in human rights abuses.186  
Additionally, in Peru, a special investigation unit was created to investigate 
cases of human rights violations in which there was information of clear 
individual responsibility and the evidence gathered was submitted to the 
prosecutor’s office for potential prosecution.187  Similarly, in Chile, a truth 
commission was able to establish individual responsibility in a number of 
cases and the list of alleged perpetrators was then submitted to the Chilean 
President to further the cases against those individuals.188  These examples 
serve to affirm the importance of justice as an objective in its own right—
one that cannot easily be supplanted by the existence of a truth commission. 
Truth commissions, then, must remain part of a comprehensive transitional 
justice strategy.189 
B.  Transitional Justice Mechanisms at Play in Nepal 
During Nepal’s ten-year conflict, thousands of people died at the hands 
of both the state government and the Maoist army.190  This section 
examines the methods utilized by the Nepali government in addressing 
Nepal’s history of human rights abuses.  It begins by looking at the status of 
criminal investigations and prosecutions in the country.  It then looks at the 
government’s use of amnesties, pardons, and withdrawals in dealing with 
human rights violators.  Finally, this section examines Nepal’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
 
 183. Bidhya Chapagain, Withdrawal of Criminal Charges:  Mockery of National 
Framework and International Commitments, 31 INFORMAL 27, 31 (2011). 
 184. Amnesty Int’l, Commissioning Justice:  Truth Commissions and Criminal Justice 16, 
AI Index POL 30/004/201 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/asset/POL30/004/2010/en/1f74d7de-f82d-4942-8b3a-a5f8f7858d77/pol30004201
0en.pdf [hereinafter Commissioning Justice]. 
 185. Rule-of-Law Tools:  Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 11. 
 186. Commissioning Justice, supra note 184, at 17. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Rule-of-Law Tools:  Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 5 (stating as a 
general principle that truth commissions should be coupled with other initiatives such as 
prosecutions, reparations, vetting, and other accountability or reform programs). 
 190. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Status of Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions 
Nepal’s Supreme Court has acknowledged the duty to thoroughly 
investigate alleged abuses.  For example, in the December 14, 2009, 
judgment in the cases of murder victims Reena Rasaili and Subadhra 
Chaulagain, the court explicitly held that the State had a responsibility to 
investigate and prosecute cases involving human rights violations.191  In its 
decision, the court stated that “[a]n act declared a crime by the law is a 
crime . . . no matter who the perpetrator is or what the circumstances 
are.”192  It emphasized that nothing should prevent the investigation into the 
alleged abuses because noninvestigation would make a “mockery of the law 
and the natural rights of civilians.”193  The court urged police to become 
“serious, proactive, and alert” in taking the necessary steps for proper 
investigation, as they had continuously shown indifference to fulfilling their 
duty to investigate.194 
As a practical matter, however, investigations into complaints have often 
been stalled or conducted haphazardly.  In the case of Yasoda Sharma v. 
Nepal,195 the enforced disappearance of Surya Prasad Sharma has not been 
investigated despite holdings from the HRC that Nepal has an obligation to 
conduct thorough investigations into alleged violations and to prosecute 
those held responsible.196  Similarly, the police have delayed their 
investigation into the alleged murder of Arjun Lama and the possible 
involvement of Minister Agni Sapkota’s in the murder.197 
This failure to adequately investigate affects Nepal’s ability to bring 
criminal prosecutions against those responsible for human rights violations.  
Article 135(2) of Nepal’s Interim Constitution gives public prosecutors the 
final say about whether to initiate a prosecution through court proceedings 
based on the information gathered from investigations.198  Additionally, 
section 6 of the State Cases Act states that public prosecutors “shall give 
necessary direction to the investigating police officer” to ensure that 
thorough investigations into filed complaints are taking place.199  It often 
 
 191. Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, Indifference to Duty:  Impunity for 
Crimes Committed in Nepal, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 7 (2010), http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/nepal1210webwcover.pdf. 
 192. Id. at 6. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 7. 
 195. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comment No. 1469/2006, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006 (2008). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Sushil Pyakurel v. Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal, WN 1094 2068 (2011), 2–3 
(Nepal) (translation provided by Advocacy Forum) (expressing the Court’s disapproval at 
the unreasonable delay in investigation by the police and stating that Sapkota had a moral 
and legal responsibility to cooperate with the police investigation). 
 198. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 135. 
 199. Waiting for Justice, supra note 16, at 34 (citing State Cases Act 2049, § 6 (1991) 
(Nepal)). 
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happens that, after investigations are completed, public prosecutors will 
decide not to proceed with a prosecution due to a lack of evidence.200 
One concern raised among human rights actors has been the existence of 
situations where the structure of prosecutorial powers has allowed public 
prosecutors to collude with police officers to ensure certain cases did not 
proceed.  In the case of Sahid Ullah Dewan, the local police initially refused 
to register the complaint, instead claiming that the victim was killed in 
crossfire and was not murdered.201  The appellate court issued a writ of 
mandamus, ordering the police to file the report and start investigations into 
the situation.202  However, the district Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) 
failed to file the court proceedings.203  When the court decision was 
communicated to the PPO at the appellate court, the appellate PPO directed 
the district PPO to file the court proceedings and aid the investigation.204  
Instead, the district PPO continued to seek approval of the decision not to 
initiate investigations.205  Examples like this one, of slow and often 
nonexistent criminal proceedings against perpetrators of human rights 
abuses, remain part of Nepal’s transitional justice landscape. 
2.  Amnesties, Pardons, and Withdrawals 
Another method that Nepal has implemented in its transitional justice 
pursuits is that of amnesties, pardons, and withdrawals.  Amnesties are legal 
measures having the effect of “(a) [p]rospectively barring criminal 
prosecution and, in some cases, civil actions against certain individuals or 
categories of individuals in respect of specified criminal conduct committed 
before the amnesty’s adoption; or (b) [r]etroactively nullifying legal 
liability previously established.”206  Although the method of implementing 
amnesties has varied from state to state, they have been widely used by 
states during transitional periods.207  Similarly, pardons are official 
 
 200. For example, in Annual Report 2066/67 of the Attorney General, it was stated that 
public prosecutors had declined to initiate prosecutions in 1,795 out of 9,682 cases because 
they believed there was a lack of evidence. Evading Accountability by Hook or by Crook:  
The Issue of Amnesties in Post-conflict Nepal, ADVOCACY FORUM, 9 (June 2011), 
http://www.advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/evading-accountability-by-
hook-or-by-crook.pdf. 
 201. See Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, Adding Insult to Injury:  Continued 
Impunity for Wartime Abuses, PEACE BRIGADES INT’L, 23 (Dec. 2011), http://
www.peacebrigades.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/publikationen_pbi_internatioal/ad
ding-insult-to-injury-nov-30-2011-english-version.pdf. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 23–24. 
 206. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-
conflict States:  Amnesties, 5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/09/1 (2009) [hereinafter Rule-of-Law 
Tools:  Amnesties]. 
 207. See Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 916 (noting that virtually every transition in the 
last several decades has involved some form of amnesty); see also Ronald C. Slye, The 
Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-
American Law:  Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 174 (2002). 
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government acts that exempt an already convicted criminal or criminals 
from serving the prescribed sentence, in whole or in part.208 
For some regimes, amnesties are seen as a necessary step in stopping a 
conflict or in securing and maintaining a transition toward a democratic 
government.209  Amnesties may be considered the price that must be paid to 
rid the country of conflict and war.210  During the armed conflict in Nepal, 
it was common for the government to induce Maoists to surrender by 
offering to withdraw any charges pending against them.211  In addition, in 
July 1998 the government of Nepal announced a general amnesty for 
members of the Maoist party who surrendered and agreed to give up 
arms.212 
Nepal also allows for pardons through Article 151 of its Interim 
Constitution, which allows the government to “grant pardons [to persons 
convicted], and to suspend, commute or remit any sentence passed by any 
court, special court, military court or by any other judicial or quasi-judicial, 
or administrative authority or institution.”213  In the case of Mukeshwor Das 
Kathwania against Constituent Assembly member Bal Krishna Dhungel, 
Maoists used Article 151 to attempt to secure a formal pardon for Dhungel 
after he had been tried and sentenced to life.214  The Supreme Court of 
Nepal held in an interim order that pardons should only be allowed in the 
“rarest of rare cases” and should never be exercised as common practice.215  
Despite the court upholding the conviction, Dhungel continues to be an 
active member of the Constituent Assembly and has yet to be arrested.216  
Media reports also show that a senior Home Ministry official was 
transferred after he refused to process the necessary paperwork to initiate a 
pardon for Dhungel.217 
An additional and related mechanism operating in Nepal is the 
withdrawal of cases against individuals.  In Nepal, the procedure for 
withdrawing cases is governed by section 29 of the State Cases Act, which 
states that cases of a political nature can be withdrawn on the basis of (a) a 
deed of reconciliation between the parties involved; or (b) a court agreeing 
to the government proposal.218  The 1998 Procedures and Norms to be 
Adopted While Withdrawing Government Cases states that this category of 
 
 208. Rule-of-Law Tools:  Amnesties, supra note 206, at 5. 
 209. Robinson, supra note 140, at 495. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 2. 
 212. Id. at 2 n.10. 
 213. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 151. 
 214. See Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, supra note 201, at 26. 
 215. ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 8. 
 216. See Plea to Ban Dhungel from Entering CA Hall, KATHMANDU POST (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/11/04/nation/plea-to-ban-dhungel-
from-entering-ca-hall/214532/. 
 217. Anil Giri, Impunity watch:  Cases Against Maoists Being Fast Withdrawn, 
KATHMANDU POST (May 18, 2011), http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/05/18/top-story/
impunity-watch-cases-against-maoists-being-fast-withdrawn/334165.html. 
 218. See ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 15. 
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offenses “shall only be withdrawn in the rarest of instances.”219  Yet, case 
withdrawal has been one of the chief methods of evading accountability for 
crimes committed during the conflict.220  A substantial number of cases 
filed in the district courts across Nepal have been withdrawn by executive 
order in an effort to further the peace process.221 
In Nepal v. Gagan Raya Yadav, involving case withdrawals, the Supreme 
Court of Nepal articulated that case withdrawals were not permissible.222  
The court held that an inherent understanding behind the case withdrawal 
provision was that it would be used with good intention and does not stand 
as an absolute right.223  In 2011, the court reversed its position and 
broadened the standard for what could be considered a political crime by 
holding that a crime committed during the conflict period is prima facie 
political in nature, and thus was appropriate for case withdrawal.224 
3.  Establishment of a Truth Commission 
The Comprehensive Peace Accord signed in 2006 obliged the 
government to set up the TRC to investigate the truth about those who have 
seriously violated human rights.225  The Interim Constitution further affirms 
the establishment of a high-level TRC charged to “investigate the facts” in 
order to “create an atmosphere of reconciliation.”226  In addition, the 
Interim Constitution provides for an investigation commission to be set for 
investigating disappearances that occurred during the ten-year conflict.227 
The draft bills of the transitional justice mechanisms indicate that both 
the TRC and the Commission on Disappearances are given broad powers to 
investigate and establish the truth behind the conflict and disappearances.228  
Yet, neither draft bill provides the commissions with prosecutorial powers, 
nor is there any indication that these transitional justice mechanisms 
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override the already established criminal justice mechanisms.229  Rather, 
they provide that each commission should submit to Nepal’s Attorney 
General the necessary information for criminal prosecutions.230 
Despite multiple drafts of the Commission’s bills, neither the TRC nor 
the Commission on Disappearances has been formed in Nepal.  Nepal’s 
Supreme Court has publicly stated that the failure to form a truth and 
reconciliation commission given the obligation of the State to do so under 
Article 33(n) of the Interim Constitution and section 5.2.5 of the CPA is a 
“sad aspect.”231 
III.  NEPAL’S (IN)ACTIONS IN FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATION 
TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY 
One of the central questions of this Note is how a transitioning state 
should address allegations of human rights abuses submitted against public 
officials in positions of influence and power.  The transitional justice 
context poses unique challenges—a transitioning state not only has to deal 
with a record of past human rights violations, but is also looking forward 
and attempting to secure peace, enhance democracy, and develop.232  
Transitioning states must also address many unique problems including, 
among other things, the people’s wariness of political regimes, a lack of 
political will, and an overwhelming number of problems to address and 
solve.233  Despite these difficulties, the transitional justice context does not 
change the legal obligations of a state.234 
Part III of this Note examines how Nepal’s actions in response to the 
abuses committed during its civil war have been inadequate, especially in 
light of the transitional justice mechanisms employed by other countries in 
post-conflict situations.  Part III begins by looking at Nepal’s reliance on 
the use of amnesties and then turns to look at its reliance on the pending 
creation of a truth commission.  Ultimately, the two together have led to 
years of virtual inaction by the Nepali government, which flies in the face 
of its international human rights obligations. 
A.  Nepal’s Reliance on Amnesties As a Violation of International Law 
There is a growing consensus in international law that sweeping 
amnesties for serious violations of human rights are illegal, regardless of 
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whether they are given in exchange for a confession or apology.235  This is 
especially true for amnesties that “prevent prosecution of individuals who 
may be criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, gross violations of human rights, or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”236 
Amnesties violate victims’ fundamental rights under international law.237  
It has been well established that victims have a fundamental right to an 
effective remedy, which imposes a duty on states to thoroughly investigate 
and prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses.238  Amnesties, by their 
very nature, deny victims the right to have the perpetrators of abuse brought 
to justice. 
Additionally, amnesties have been shown to impede the desired objective 
of peace in post-conflict societies.239  Peace conditioned on impunity for 
serious crimes in violation of human rights is not sustainable.240  In Sierra 
Leone, for example, the existence of three blanket amnesty provisions 
hindered the peace process and indeed failed to solidify peace during the 
eleven-year civil war.241  Under the belief that amnesty was necessary for a 
ceasefire, a provision providing amnesty to all combatants who had 
committed human rights abuses during the conflict was included in the 
1999 Lome Peace Accord.242  Rather than secure peace, the amnesty 
provisions created an expectation that later agreements would contain 
similar provisions, thus further emboldening human rights abusers.243  
What followed after each peace agreement was an increase in violations of 
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human rights and the progressively numerous and severe instances of rape, 
torture, and summary executions instead of the peace that was hoped for.244  
After the rise in atrocities, the policy was reversed in favor of the 
prosecution and punishment of those involved in international crimes.245  
This policy was solidified in the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone, which stated that prior amnesty provisions would not bar the 
prosecution of those implicated in human rights abuses.246 
As in the case of Sierra Leone, justice may require setting aside 
previously agreed upon amnesty laws entered into as a condition for ending 
conflict.247  This may very well be the case in Nepal, where numerous 
members of Nepal’s Army and individuals within the Maoist ranks who 
were responsible for abuses during the conflict period continue to evade 
accountability, thus pointing toward limited political commitment to serious 
accountability processes that would challenge the current culture of 
impunity.248  Without a threat of action against human rights abusers, Nepal 
will be unable to sufficiently transition into a state premised on the rule of 
law. 
B.  Nepal’s Reliance on Truth Commissions As a Violation of 
Domestic and International Law 
One of the primary arguments put forward by authorities in Nepal against 
prosecutions of human rights violators is that the crimes committed during 
the conflict should be addressed by transitional justice mechanisms, 
including the proposed TRC and Commission on Disappearances, neither of 
which has been formed.249  The transitional justice mechanisms of truth 
commissions in their varied forms have an important role in assisting a 
country to move from a conflict-ridden society to a more democratic 
society.250  However, the assertion that crimes committed during the 
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conflict can or should be addressed solely by such mechanisms has no basis 
in Nepali or international law. 
Nepal’s national legal and policy framework support the contention that 
criminal justice mechanisms must be pursued independent of the efforts of 
both the TRC and Commission on Disappearances.  Even within the 
language contained in the CPA and Interim Constitution obliging the Nepali 
government to set up the TRC, there is no mention of the TRC having 
exclusive powers to deal with international crimes and serious violations of 
human rights.251  Nor does the language suggest that regular judicial 
mechanisms be suppressed.252  Rather, when read in conjunction with 
Clause 7.1.3 of the CPA, which affirms the commitment of the parties to 
ensuring that impunity is combated and the rights of victim are protected, it 
is clear that the criminal justice system is meant to function in parallel with 
the establishment of the TRC.253  Additionally, Article 100 of the Interim 
Constitution reaffirms that the “[p]owers relating to justice in Nepal shall be 
exercised by courts and other judicial institutions in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution, the laws and the recognized principles of 
justice.”254  Nepal’s Supreme Court jurisprudence further indicates that the 
transitional justice system does not supersede criminal justice mechanisms. 
Rather, the court has held that the regular justice system gains increasing 
momentum and importance in situations where the transitional justice 
system has not yet been established.255  The court stressed that the “law and 
justice system is never inactive in a democratic country; law is never 
vacant.”256 
One of the greatest advantages of a truth commission is that it can begin 
its functions relatively quickly, as compared to the processes within the 
criminal justice system.257  But, a delay in a commission’s tasks will 
quickly deplete this benefit and instead lead to a loss of confidence and 
interests in the commission’s potential to bring accountability and 
change.258  In light of the State’s inability to create either the TRC or the 
Disappearances Commission, the Supreme Court of Nepal in June 2007 
issued a decision on a case involving enforced disappearances that stressed 
the urgency of investigating and prosecuting such offenses, as required by 
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constitutional and international law.259  It stated that “the legal 
investigation, prosecution and remedies to be implemented with respect to a 
remedial mechanism involving fundamental rights cannot be a matter of 
secondary priority and in addition, are not outside the jurisdiction of this 
Court.”260  Thus, the rights of victims to an effective remedy must be 
protected through effective mechanisms. 
C.  Inaction is Not Action 
Combating impunity in a post-conflict society hoping to emerge from its 
past by establishing the rule of law can only be done by holding 
perpetrators accountable and thereby showing that consequences will 
swiftly follow those who choose to commit human rights violations.261  
Through the use of administrative sanctions or criminal prosecutions, the 
new government will be able to show its commitment to combat impunity, 
which will not only deter future crimes from being committed but also 
promote public confidence in the new regimes.  Accountability processes 
are an essential component of longer term peace building and failure to 
pursue civil or criminal actions against perpetrators of human rights only 
serves to undermine the legitimacy of new governments.262 
Justice will inevitably be imperfect in the transitional context.263  Despite 
the problems associated with the pursuit of justice, newly democratic states 
must continue the pursuit in order to establish a society reflecting a firmly 
established rule of law.264  The multitude of challenges faced in post-
conflict environments necessitates an approach that balances various goals, 
including the pursuit of accountability, the need for truth, the preservation 
of peace, and the building of democracy.265  Successful transitional justice 
programs will likely necessitate the use of various mechanisms to meet all 
the goals of transitional justice. 
The use of various mechanisms in conjunction with one another ensures 
that all gaps in the justice spectrum are filled.  A comprehensive program 
will ensure that every victim will receive some justice and ensure that all of 
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society will benefit.  For example, criminal prosecutions through court 
systems can help to determine individual culpability and to punish 
individuals accordingly.266  Meanwhile, a vetting process can aim at 
reforming institutions through linking the past conduct of individuals to 
institutions.267  And finally, a truth commission provides an accounting of 
the social dynamics behind the conflict and builds a collective memory of 
the nation’s conflict.268  With the different types of information and 
different methods of action, a holistic approach toward justice can be 
implemented and can help pave the way for a holistic peace. 
Nepal’s current approach of inaction is not only unsound as a legal 
matter but is also unlikely to sustain peace and democracy.  Impunity is the 
current standard of reality in Nepal.  The legacy of enduring impunity for 
past crimes could have long-lasting negative repercussions on Nepal’s 
ability to develop and maintain the rule of law.  As Jyoti Sanghera, the chief 
of HRC for Nepal, said, “Lack of accountability in cases of alleged human 
rights violations not only sends a message that there are no consequences 
for the perpetrators of such violations, but further adds to the suffering of 
the victims and their families who have been awaiting justice for many 
years.”269 
CONCLUSION 
Nepal is at a tipping point—its decisions during this transition period will 
set a tone for its development as a country and the possibility of a peaceful, 
democratic future.  There are a wide range of transitional justice 
mechanisms within Nepal’s reach.  Regardless of the combination of 
mechanisms that Nepal chooses to implement, one lesson that cannot be 
ignored is that inaction during such a critical period will only prove 
detrimental.  Nepal must act.  Creating a “new Nepal” will require much 
more than political statements and formal agreements; it will require serious 
political commitment to the principle of the rule of law and challenging the 
culture of impunity. 
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